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Abstract This paper compares the depth of the recent crisis and the Great Depression. We use a 
new data set to compare the drop in activity in the industrialized countries for seven activity 
indicators. This is done under the assumption that the recent crisis leveled off in mid-2009 for 
production and will do so for unemployment in 2010. Our data indicate that the recent crisis indeed 
had the potential to be another Great Depression, as shown by the speed and simultaneity of the 
decline in the first nine months. However, if we assume that a large second dip can be avoided, the 
drop in all indicators will have been smaller than during the Great Depression. This holds true 
specifically for GDP, employment and prices, and least for manufacturing output. The difference in 
the depth in the crises concurs with differences in policy reaction. This time monetary policy and 
fiscal policy were applied courageously, speedily and partly internationally coordinated. During the 
Great Depression for several years fiscal policy tried to stabilize budgets instead of aggregate 
demand, and either monetary policy was not applied or was rather ineffective insofar as deflation 
turned lower nominal interest rates into higher real rates. Only future research will be able to prove 
the exact impact of economic policy, but the current tentative conclusion is that economic policy 
prevented the recent crisis from developing into a second Great Depression. This is also a partial 
vindication for economists. The majority of them might not have been able to predict the crisis, but 
the science did learn its lesson from the Great Depression and was able to give decent policy advice 
to at least limit the depth of the recent crisis. 
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 1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the drop in economic activity in the 
recent crisis1 has been as large as in the Great Depression of the nineteen thirties. 
To do this we make use of a new set of data on activity indicators and on policy 
variables for ten industrialized countries. To make the task tractable we assume 
that the crisis leveled off in mid 2009 as far as production (GDP) is concerned. 
This assumption indeed represents the consensus of forecasters and international 
institutions at present, which forecast growth of world GDP at rates about 3% for 
2010 and 2011. The consensus of the forecasters also maintains that 
unemployment will continue to increase in 2010 and therefore we include 
predicted unemployment for 2010 when we compare employment effects between 
the Great Depression and the recent crisis.  
The data show that the drop in activity has definitely been smaller in the recent 
crisis. The crisis had however the potential to become as severe as the Great 
Depression. This supposition finds its roots in the very speed and simultaneity 
with which manufacturing and exports declined between the summer 2008 and 
spring 2009. In the recent crisis economic policy reacted expeditiously, prudently, 
and to a surprising extent coordinated at an international level. It is true that there 
were structural features which served to mitigate the depth of the recent crisis such 
as the lower share of manufacturing and the higher share of services and the public 
sector in comparison with the Great Depression. However, the increasing 
globalization of production, trade and financial markets today could actually have 
led to a cumulative downward spiral difficult to stop through national policies. 
What data show is that the decline of trade occurred quick and rather simultaneous 
across countries, but soon GDP dynamics started to diverge significantly between 
Asian countries and the United States or Europe. 
This paper presents empirical data and stylized facts. It builds on the large and 
increasing literature on the causes of the recent crisis, and on the similarities and 
differences between the roots of the two crises.2 We intentionally do not survey 
_________________________ 
1 The recent crisis has been labeled as “Great Recession” by Krugman (2009b), Taylor (2009). 
Almunia et al. (2009) call it “Great Credit Crisis”, Aiginger (2009a) “Current Crisis”, Romer (2009) 
“Current Recession”. 
2 See Aiginger (2009a), Barrell and Stankov (2008), Bordo (2008), Cooper (2008), Gros and Alcidi 
(2009), Helbling (2009), Kindleberger (1986), Krugman (2009a, b, c), Taylor (2009). 
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 the literature on the roots of the two crises, nor do we present an own analysis on 
the causes of the crisis. We very shortly summarize our own understanding of the 
three broad roots of the recent crisis and refer to Aiginger (2009a) for more. We 
include however data for the build-up period of the two crises in order to further 
the empirical based understanding about causes of the crises. Activity indicators 
which are used to measure the depth of the crises are made available for the build-
up periods too. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the research 
question and its limits. It reports early assessments as to the depth of the crisis, to 
demonstrate how different the expectations and the interpretation about the depth 
as compared to the Great Depression were in the early stage of the recent crisis. 
Then we describe the data used in this paper and which indicators and countries 
we focus on. Section 3 provides the main evidence, namely the relative drop in 
economic activity in the two crises. Section 4 describes the speed and 
synchronization of the downturn at their start. Section 5 analyzes the differences in 
economic policy reaction, focusing on fiscal and monetary policy. This helps to 
increase knowledge on the measures taken, final conclusions about their impact 
will only be known later and by thorough econometrics. Section 6 reports 
indicators on trade openness and changing structural characteristics between the 
start of the Great Depression and the recent crisis and lists some caveats about the 
findings. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Research Agenda, Data, Claims 
The main research question of this paper is to compare the severity of the two 
crises; more specifically how much did the main economic activity variables drop 
(their relative change) compared with their pre-crisis maximum? The subsidiary 
question is how economic policy worked; more specifically we present indicators 
on monetary and fiscal policy, which show which measures were taken. Data for 
both questions are made as much comparable as possible, for the two crises as well 
as for the countries investigated. 
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 The pre-crisis peak in the Great Depression, for most indicators and most 
countries, was 1929. This time it was 2008.3 In both cases economic strains and 
disequilibria were lingering around after a period of rapid growth and in both cases 
the peak year was a year where many problems were quite evident with hindsight. 
These problems, however, became dramatically visible in a specific month or 
quarter. In 1929 this month was October (with the famous Black Thursday or 
Friday) and in 2008 it was September (with the demise of Lehman Brothers).  
The expectations about the depth of the recent crisis were very different, not 
only at the start of the crisis, but even after several months of its evolvement. To 
demonstrate this diversity, we single out three leading US economists which 
should have had rather similar access to data, were educated at leading US 
universities and known for policy orientation. 
• Barry Eichengreen (together with Kevin O'Rourke) wrote: “To summarize: 
The world is currently undergoing an economic shock every bit as big as the 
Great Depression shock of 1929–30”.4 This statement became very important 
since it was extremely well documented by empirical facts. The Vox column in 
which it was presented shattered all previous records, with 100.000 views 
within a week, the article was sent to me every week by at least one friend, 
who shared this view. The basis for the claim was data on industrial 
production, world trade and stock market prices.  
• Paul Krugman early took the position that the current crisis might be only “half 
a Great Depression” and therefore called it Great Recession. He provided data 
showing that fall in US manufacturing had been milder from its late 2007 peak 
as compared to that from the mid 1929 peak.5 Eichengreen and O'Rourke 
contradict this evidence, criticizing it by saying that “looking at the US leads 
one to overlook how alarming the current situation is even in comparison with 
1929–30.” 
_________________________ 
3 In a few countries 2007 had been the peak for annual data (absolute values) with a small decline in 
2008. 
4 Eichengreen and O'Rourke (2009; April 6, 2009). 
5 Krugman (2009c; March 20, 2009). 
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 • Christine Romer (2009: 1) may mark the other end of the assessment, when 
she wrote in early March 2009 that the “current recession … pales in 
comparison with what our parents and grandparents experienced in the 1930s.” 
All three citations were made within three weeks in the quarter in which the 
decline of GDP reached its climax in most industrialized countries. The data 
provided will show which of these statements about the relation between the depth 
of the Great Depression versus the current crisis looks to be more consistent with 
the data one year after they were made. 
In general there are surprisingly few studies comparing the depth of the two 
crises up to now. We have cited already Eichengreen and O’Rourke. The great 
advantage of their approach is the use of monthly data, and the quick updating of 
these. The main shortcoming of Eichengreen and O’Rourke’s analysis is that they 
do not report data on GDP, unemployment and employment.6 Romer (2009) 
concentrates on policy issues, drawing six lessons from the comparison. 
Furthermore there exist a series of papers calculating the average length and depth 
of a larger number of crises in different countries on GDP, the stock market, 
unemployment etc. (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) or analyze how the length and 
depth of the crises depend on certain structural characteristics, inter alia whether 
there had been a housing or financial crisis at the start.  
One of the reasons why there are few studies comparing the depth of the two 
crises up to now is the lack of data, at least the lack of data which is easily 
accessible for research purposes. Historical data are available but they lack a 
quarterly dimension or are only available for every fifth year. Data on exports and 
industrial production was available during the thirties but has not been preserved 
in most international data bases. Surprisingly, none of the large organizations 
which provide excellent international data today (OECD, EU, IMF) have a 
consistent database covering the recent crisis and the Great Depression and 
offering it to the research community. The WIFO research team therefore had to 
collect the data from various sources7 and invested much time and effort to make 
_________________________ 
6 A difference to this paper is the choice of the starting month namely June 1929 for the Great 
Depression and April 2008 for the recent crisis. Their choices are based on NBER data for business 
cycles for the USA. 
7 The main sources for historical data are Mitchell (1993, 2003), Maddison (1995, 2003), Groningen 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/, WIFO Monthly Bulletin 1927–1934. 
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 pre and post WWII data comparable. Sometimes it had to fill gaps using sensible 
interpolations. Finally, data on GDP, manufacturing, exports, stock markets, 
employment and unemployment are available on an annual basis. For stock 
markets and industrial output indicators are additionally available on a quarterly 
basis.8 For the evaluation of the policy reaction we use fiscal balances, the debt-
GDP ratio, money supply (M1), discount rates, interest rates, inflation (CPI), an 
openness indicator and tariff receipts relative to GDP. 
We analyze the activity and policy reactions in large industrialized countries, 
namely the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Spain, and add small countries like Austria (where the Great Depression was 
specifically large), Sweden and Finland (where the effects were particularly small) 
and Belgium. For all indicators we construct an unweighted “World”: this is the 
unweighted average over the ten industrialized countries. This proves to be the 
best indicator as to the depth of the crises in industrialized countries.9 In those 
cases in which reported data for all countries are available we use the term World 
without quote signs. The ten countries included made up for 52% of world GDP in 
1929 (and 38% today). 
Another understandable reason for the lack of quantitative comparisons on the 
relative depth of the two crises might be that it could be considered premature to 
give a final assessment if we do not know for sure that the recent crisis is over. We 
cannot be certain that the recovery will not be W-shaped with a second steep 
decline in 2011 or later. A small second dip (or a “growth recession”) would, 
however, not change our results, only a large one (see also “Caveat 1” in Section 
6). 
3 The Main Stylized Facts about the Depth of the Crises 
According to all indicators the recent crisis is comparatively smaller. We define 
the depth of the crisis as the relative drop between the peak year and the year with 
_________________________ 
8 Stock markets data is available on a daily basis (and even higher frequencies). End of the period 
data (for a quarter or a month) are used. We also obtained access to the monthly data on exports and 
manufacturing used in Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009). 
9 We calculate also a GDP-weighted average over the ten countries and call it “GDP-weighted 
World” but do not publish these data in the tables. 
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 the lowest activity. For the recent crisis we repeat the calculation on a quarterly 
basis (column 3 in Table 1). This biases the comparison towards enlarging the 
recent crisis relative to the Great Depression because annual data hides many 
fluctuations visible in quarterly data. 
3.1 Large Differences in GDP, Inflation, and Employment 
The difference between the Great Depression and the recent crisis is specifically 
large for GDP and price dynamics (deflation). The difference is still very 
pronounced for employment and unemployment data and for exports, less so for 
stock market prices and the least pronounced for manufacturing output. 
GDP dropped by 10% in the Great Depression, but only by 4% in the recent 
crisis according to annual data, and by 5% if we use quarterly data. The decrease 
in annual GDP was larger in eight of the ten countries in Table 2, in the United 
States, Germany, and France more than four times as large. Using quarterly data 
instead of annual data for the recent crisis does not change the picture much. In 
Finland the recent crisis seems marginally deeper than the Great Depression, in 
Japan total GDP had not fallen between 1929 and 1932. 
These data refer to the ten industrialized countries using an unweighted 
average. Weighing the countries by GDP would specifically increase the impact of 
the development in the United States: the drop in the Great Depression would 
increase to 15.8%, that in the current crisis would be slightly smaller (–3.2%; 
annual data). An estimate of World GDP is directly available for the Great 
Depression by Maddison (1995): GDP dropped according to this estimate by 9.8% 
between 1932 and 1929 approximately equal to the unweighted average of the ten 
industrialized countries. This time World GDP decreased by only 1.3% in 2009 
(this is less than the unweighted average of the ten industrialized countries as well 
as the weighted average). 
Summarizing all three calculations give the same results, namely that the 
recent crisis was definitely smaller for GDP. We prefer the unweighted average 
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 Table 1: Stylized Facts: Activity Indicators 
 
Unweighted average over ten industrialized countries. – 1) At PPP. - 2) Unweighted average over the 
United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom. - 3) Absolute difference 1929 to 1932 vs. 2008 to 
2010. Ten industrialized countries: Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Japan. 
Source: GDP: WIFO database, Groningen, BEA. IMF: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, http://www.ggdc.net/databases/hna.htm, 
http://www.bea.gov/, - Manufacturing: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (1993, 2003), IFS, ST.AT.: 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/IMF/logon.aspx, http://www.statistik.at/ - Exports: WIFO calculations 
using Mitchell (1993, 2003), IFS, WTO.: http://www.imfstatistics.org/IMF/logon.aspx, 
http://www.wto.org/ - Stock markets: WIFO calculations for the United States using 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm and http://stooq.de/q/d/?s=nikkei&c=0&i=m for Japan; 
NBER Macrohistory Database; http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^CDAXX, Gregor Gielen (1960–
1979) for Germany; NBER Macrohistory Database; http://stooq.de/q/d/?s=cac40, IMF for France; ; 
http://stooq.de/q/d/?s=ftse250&c=0&i=m , IMF for the United Kingdom; Monatsberichte des 
Österreichischen Instituts für Konjunkturforschung; http://stooq.de/q/d/?s=atx&c=0&i=m, IMF for 
Austria. − Employment: WIFO calculations using The Economist; Economic Statistics 1900–1983, 
1985 and OECD; Eurostat. − Unemployment: WIFO calculations using The Economist; Economic 
Statistics 1900–1983, 1985 and OECD; Eurostat. − Inflation: WIFO calculations using Mitchell, 
Eurostat. 
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 Table 2: Comparison of Two Crises: Decline of Real GDP**) 
 
** At PPP; forecast real data. -* 2007. – 1) 2Q2009/2Q2008. – 2) 1Q2009/1Q2008. –  
3) 2Q2009/1Q2008. - 4) Weighted by GDP. Ten industrialized countries: Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan. 
Source: WIFO calculations using Maddison (1995, 2003), IMF, Groningen, BEA, Butschek (1997).: 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/IMF/logon.aspx , http://www.ggdc.net/databases/hna.htm , http://bea.org  
over ten industrialized countries because it does not give exceptionally large 
weight to one country. Using each of the other concepts would furthermore enlarge 
the differences between the two crises: using weighted average because the drop in 
the Great Depression would increase, using reported World Output Data, since it 
would reduce the drop in the recent crises due to the development in China. 
If the forecasts of the IMF prove correct, the loss in world GDP in 2009 will be 
more than compensated by the growth expected for world GDP in 2010. This 
would mean the drop was small and was recovered within two years as far as 
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 world output is concerned. Recovering the output loss took six years during the 
Great Depression.10
In the Great Depression, prices declined by 13% (between 1929 and 1932). In 
the recent crisis inflation−as measured by consumer price indices−was rather high 
in 2008, and prices increased on top of the high price level by 1% in 2009. No 
deflation occurred this time for any of the ten countries for the whole of 2009, with 
the exception of Japan11, and no deflation is forecast for industrialized countries in 
2010. Inflation is measured by consumer price indices, but the statement holds also 
for core inflation. Prices for many traded goods declined in the recent crisis (see 
export figures in Table 1). 
Employment decreased by 17% between 1929 and 1932, but only by 2.5% in 
2009 (and forecasts are flat for 2010). Unemployment increased by 13 percentage 
points during the Great Depression and the unemployment rate reached 20% in 
1932. This time it increased by three percentage points if we include the further 
rise predicted for 2010 (to an unemployment rate of 9% in the unweighted average 
of the ten countries). 
3.2 Smaller Differences for Exports, Manufacturing, Stock Markets 
World exports (in nominal terms) declined by 58% between 1929 and 1932. In the 
recent crisis they dropped by 17%12. Manufacturing output dropped by 23%, 
versus 20% in the recent crisis (for annual data). The decline of exports is much 
larger since exports are measured in nominal terms, while manufacturing output is 
measured in real terms.13  
_________________________ 
10 The data for world GDP come from Maddison (1995), since world GDP is published only for 
some years the missing years were interpolated by WIFO with the development in nine countries for 
which annual figures are available. 
11 Quarterly data show slightly declining prices for the majority of countries at least in one quarter of 
2009. 
12 These data are calculated at the annual basis; the drop was 25% on a quarterly basis. 
13 For weighted data the difference in the drop of output for manufacturing is larger between the 
crises. As for manufacturing output is concerned it is a major shortcoming that China is not included 
in the main set of ten countries.  
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 Stock market prices dropped by 53% between 1929 and 1932, by 45% in the 
recent crisis.14 In the Great Depression there was no lasting recovery until 1939, 
in comparison with just 18 months between the pre-crisis peak and the trough in 
the recent crisis. The recovery between March 2009 and March 2010 was 53%, a 
recovery which may not be sustainable at this speed. There never was such a large 
and sustained interim recovery in the Great Depression (the maximum interim 
recovery between 11M/1929 and 4M/1930 was 13%). 
In summary the cumulative drop in activity in the Great Depression was much 
larger for GDP, prices and employment. The fall in exports and stock market 
prices between peak and trough was larger during the Great Depression too; the 
difference is larger specifically for quarterly data. Nearest comes the decline in 
manufacturing output (if measured in real terms). Analyses which concentrate on 
exports, manufacturing and stock market indicators but do not make use of GDP, 
prices and employment data underestimate the difference between the two crises. 
4 Time Pattern, Speed, and Synchronization 
In both crises in the build-up phase there was high growth, namely about 41% 
between 1921 and 1929 and 48% if we include the nineties in the build-up period 
of the recent crisis.15 GDP growth in the build-up period of the Great Depression 
was more volatile and different across countries (see Table 2 and Figure 1). In 
comparison the build-up was much smoother from 1990 up to the start of the 
recent crisis (with the dot.com crisis causing only a small dip in GDP).16  
The synchronization is stronger during the recent crisis. During the Great 
Depression the drop in GDP was concentrated mainly in four countries, namely 
the United States (–27%), Germany (–16%), Austria (–20%) and France (–15%).  
 
_________________________ 
14 On the quarterly base stock market prices declined by 69% (between 3Q1929 and 2Q1932) in the 
Great Depression and by 54% (between 2Q2007 and 1Q2009) in the recent crisis (unweighted 
average over four countries: the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom; see Table 1). 
15 If we use the shorter build-up period 2000/2008 the growth had been 18%. 
16 Standard deviation of growth rates across countries was 25.3 in the build-up period of the Great 
Depression and 13.1 this time. 
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 Figure 1: Macroeconomic growth (GDP, real): boom and decline (See Section 4) 
 
www.economics-ejournal.org 11 
  
1) At PPP.  
Source: See Table 1. 
Real GDP decreased by 5% or less in the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan, Finland 
and Sweden. In the recent crisis GDP declined in all ten countries reported, with 
declines between 3% and 5½% according to annual data and 3½% and 8½% 
according to quarterly data. Cross country differences were much smaller in the 
recent crisis as shown specifically by the lower standard deviation of the rate of 
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 declines of GDP (0.9 vs. 8.9).17 The greater level of synchronization in the recent 
crisis is shown for all indicators by a large margin (see Table 3). Relatively the 
least difference is shown for exports, whose drop was to a greater extent already 
synchronized in the Great Depression.  
The speed of the breakdown of activity at the start of the recent crisis is 
highlighted if we analyze quarterly or monthly data on manufacturing and exports.  
Industrial production declined by 19% between 3Q2008 and 1Q2009, and then 
leveled off. During the Great Depression it declined by 12% in the first three 
quarters and did not recover before 1932. Only one half of the total decline 
therefore happened in the first three quarters in the Great Depression. This time 
manufacturing output resumed growth after three quarters. The standard deviation 
of the decline in the first three quarters (across countries) is again much smaller in 
the recent crisis. 
Table 3: Synchronization  
 
1) At PPP. − 2) Absolute difference 1929–1921 vs. 2008–2000. Ten industrialized countries: Austria, 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan. 
Source: See Table 2. 
_________________________ 
17 The coefficient of variation for the reported countries was 0.8 vs. 0.3 (negative signs in the 
coefficient of variation should be ignored). The largest decreases in countries not reported in Table 2 
occurred in the Baltic States, Slovakia, and Iceland this time; during the Great Depression the largest 
decreases were in Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Latin America. 
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 Using monthly data on world manufacturing output (by Eichengreen and 
O’Rourke), the decline in manufacturing output in the recent crisis occurred 
between 4M2008 and 2M2009. The decline for the first nine months amounted to 
17% (see Table 4 and Table 5). For the same length of time in the Great 
Depression the decline was 16%. This time the production started to recover after 
three quarters, during the Great Depression it dropped further to an overall decline 
of 38%. Again the variation across countries was much less in the recent crisis, a 
fact that holds true from the very first month of decline and also for the ten months 
together (during which output declined). 
World trade declined in the recent crisis from 4M2008 to 1M2009, on average 
this amounted to 20% amongst the countries analyzed18. For the same time span 
the decline was –17% in the Great Depression; again this was only half of the 
 
Table 4: Speed of Downturn in the First Three Quarters 
 
1) At PPP. – 2) Eichengreen and O‘Rourke (trade). Ten industrialized countries: Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan. 
Source: See Table 2. 
_________________________ 
18 Data made available by Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009). 
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 Table 5: Comparison of Two Crises: Industrial Production 
 
* 01 - 05/2009 compared to 01 - 05/2008. - ** 1929/1923. – 1) Peak/2008. – 2) Peak/2007. – 
3) 1Q2009/peak. – 4) Weighted by GDP. --"World": Countries in table weighted by GDP. 
Source: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (1993, 2003), IFS, ST.AT: 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/IMF/logon.aspx, http://www.statistik.at/ 
overall decline (–36%; which stopped in 8M1932). Standard deviation of the 
decline of exports across the countries was 6.2 in the recent crisis, and 8.4 in the 
Great Depression. 
We draw the tentative conclusion from the steep and fast decline of 
manufacturing and exports in the first three quarters that the recent crisis did 
indeed have some potential to develop into a crisis as big as the Great Depression. 
The level of synchronization in the drops in manufacturing and exports, probably 
due to globalization, added to that potential. In the next chapter we investigate how 
economic policy reacted differently this time and thus prevented the crisis 
unfolding more dramatically. 
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 5 Policy Reaction 
It is not easy to compare economic policy in periods as distant as the Great 
Depression and the recent crisis. Institutions are very different as are strategies of 
countries and the coordination between them. The gold standard restricted 
monetary policy in most countries during the Great Depression. The central banks 
were less coordinated, had different objectives and policy instruments and some 
countries still had obligations and/or debts from World War I. All countries had 
separate currencies, and lenders of last resort did not exist to the extent they do 
today. Automatic stabilizers for fiscal budgets were much smaller. Import duties 
made up an important share of government receipts. Regional integration areas 
like EU and NAFTA did not exist. No international competition authority could 
prevent blunt forms of protectionism or subsidies and no World Trade 
Organization could monitor openness by reference to trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, we will try to describe the differences for monetary policy, using 
indicators on money supply and interest rates (see Table 6). As regards fiscal 
policy we will use indicators on public deficits and debt.  
5.1 Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy was restrictive in the Great Depression, at least in the first years 
(see Figure 2). This had partly purposefully been the case (e.g. the increase in the 
discount rates in 1929), and partly been the consequence of the gold standard or 
the necessity to prevent capital outflows. Discount rates were then lowered 
somewhat, but not towards zero as in the recent crisis. Furthermore, high deflation 
turned low nominal interest rates into very high real rates. Money supply 
decreased up to 1933, with countries abandoning the gold standard earlier having 
more room for maneuver and thus a quicker recovery (see Eichengreen and 
O’Rourke 2009; Bernanke 2004). In the recent crisis discount rates were promptly 
slashed towards zero and there was a coordinated approach between the United 
States, the EU, and the United Kingdom. Money supply was expanded, 
governments guarantees were given for savings and loans etc. Innovative forms of 
extending money supply and providing credits were applied. 
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 Table 6: Policy Indicators 
 
1) 1Q2009 -3Q2009. – 2) 1Q2009-3Q2009/1Q2008-3Q2008. Ten industrialized countries: Austria, 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan. 
Sources: Money supply: WIFO calculations using IFS, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/index.htm, http://www.riksbank.com/ 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, Interest rates: WIFO calculations using Mitchell, IFS. 
Fiscal balances: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (2003), IFS (1980), Bundesrechnungsabschluss: 
http://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/berichte/bundesrechnungsabschluss.html, Debt: WIFO-calculations 
using Mitchell (1999), Bundesrechnungsabschluss. Customs: Hahn and Magerl (2006). 
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 Figure 2: Money Supply; Great Depression vs. Recent Crisis 
 
Source: WIFO calculations using IFS, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank. 
5.1.1 Great Depression 
In the United States the Fed increased the discount rate from 3.8% in 1927 to 5.3% 
in 1929 in order to curb stock market speculation. In the following two years it 
was reduced in two steps to 2.5% in 1931. The United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Austria (and to a minor degree Germany) followed a similar pattern of increasing 
discount rates at the start of the Great Depression, followed by a later decrease; 
Austria and Germany had to maintain a very high nominal discount rate of 7% up 
to 1931 to restrict capital outflow inter alia after bank failures. 
Money supply19 decreased by 21% in the United States and 29% in Germany 
between 1929 and 1932.20 Indicators show that bank runs had reduced the velocity 
of money (Aiginger 2009; Bernanke 2004), so that reduced money supply was not 
the direct result of a restrictive monetary policy of the central banks only. Money 
_________________________ 
19 Money supply is defined as M1; i.e. currency plus sight deposits. Broader concepts on money 
supply will probably show a steeper decrease in nominal figures during the Great Depression which 
imply also a (stronger) decline in real money supply. 
20 There is surprisingly little discussion about the money supply in real terms. Since prices were 
falling by cumulatively 13% the decrease in nominal money of only 8% would imply an increasing 
real money supply for the average of the ten industrialized countries. For the United States nominal 
money supply decreased by 21% between 1929 and 1932, deflation amounted to 20% (Germany 
-29% vs. -22%). In these two countries real money supply decreased too but by a (very) low margin. 
I owe this perspective to a critique by Gunther Tichy. 
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 supply started to grow as late as 1933/34, the fourth and fifth year respectively of 
the Great Depression. 
The only exception with respect to the restrictive use of monetary policy was 
France. It lowered its discount rate to 3.5% in 1929 to 2.1% in 1931. Money 
supply increased by 20% from 1929 to 1932. 
Deflation amounted to 13% (cumulatively) for the average of the countries 
from 1929 to 1932, with the highest price cuts in the United States and Germany. 
A main difference between the Great Depression and the recent crisis is that 
deflationary pressure had been lingering around before 1929, specifically in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. By contrast 2008 was a year with rising 
prices worldwide as the consequence of strong growth and buoyant demand for 
raw materials, oil and food. Deflation led to two digit real interest rates in 
Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and the United States at least for a few 
years during the Great Depression. 
5.1.2 Recent Crisis 
By contrast, monetary policy in the recent crisis slashed discount rates to less than 
1% in the EU, in the United Kingdom and in the United States soon after the 
breaking down of the credit markets (after the demise of Lehman Brothers). 
Central banks flooded the markets by boosting the money supply by open market 
purchases and less conventional measures of “quantitative easing”. This included 
buying commercial papers and changing the rules for collaterals. The extent of the 
measures taken by monetary authorities is not something that can be clearly seen 
from money supply indicators themselves (such as M1), but rather from the 
increase in the assets in the balance sheets of the central banks (see Table 11 in 
Aiginger (2009c)). However, money supply increased by 17% between 3Q2008 
and 3Q2009 in the United States and by 8% in the EU (see Table 7). 
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 Table 7: Comparison of Two Crises: Discount Rates and Money Supply (M1) 
 
"World": Weighted by GDP 
Source for interest rates: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (1993, 2003), IFS.Source for money 
supply: WIFO calculations using IFS, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/index.htm, 
http://www.riksbank.com/  
Monetary policy was coordinated between the main regions. Monetary and 
fiscal policy crossed where governments offered guarantees for deposits and loans 
and banks were recapitalized. Where necessary, governments took a stake 
(temporary ownership) in banks and sometimes even manufacturing firms and 
supported “bad” banks or ring fenced toxic assets. 
Thus monetary policy could be applied in a very determined and offensive way 
in the recent crisis. Firstly, it was not limited by the gold standard and many 
countries did not need to defend a national currency. Secondly, the remit of 
monetary policy was interpreted flexibly and broadly. Thirdly, there were no 
haunting memories of hyperinflation since globalization and European integration 
had led to decades of low inflation. Most European countries were sheltered from 
devaluation by membership in the euro area. Some countries which were not 
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 members of the EMU had to devalue.21 They had less room to lower interest rates. 
They were, however, supported by the IMF and the EU. 
5.2 Fiscal Policy 
5.2.1 Great Depression 
Fiscal policy was not used during the Great Depression to counter the declining 
economic activity, at least not in the first three years. On the contrary governments 
tried to counteract the automatic stabilization effect of a reduced tax inflow.22 
This time, at least in the United States and France, the increasing deficit was not 
counteracted by tax increases. In the following years the average deficit amounted 
to 2.3% (average 1933 to 1936). 
Six countries had a budget surplus in 1928 (see Table 8), four a deficit, neither 
was large (maybe with the exception of the surplus of Japan). In 1929 the budget 
position moved in four countries towards “more restrictive”, in six countries into 
mild expansion.23 All changes were minor, so that the small surplus of 0.7% of 
GDP remained constant. In 1931−the third year of the crisis−the position switched 
into a deficit, which then increased slowly to 2.8% in 1936. 24  
Thus budgetary policy tried at the start of the Great Depression to prevent 
deficits at first but with little success.25 From 1932 on it started to some extent to 
support economic activity. This holds specifically true for the United States and  
 
_________________________ 
21 For example Hungary and the Ukraine. 
22 Ideally, any thorough evaluation of fiscal policy would need “full employment budget data” to 
show the extent and length of the restrictive impact of purposive fiscal policy in the Great 
Depression. Such data are available as to our knowledge only for the United States (Brown 1956). 
23 More restrictive means that a surplus increased or a deficit was reduced. Expansionary implies 
that a deficit increased or a surplus was reduced. 
24 This is the average over all countries with deficits of 7% in the United States and France. 
25 The conclusion of Brown (1956: 22) reads “fiscal policy has been an unsuccessful recovery 
device in the thirties … not because it did not work, but because it was not tried”. Hansen’s reads 
(1939:50) “despite a fairly good showing made in the recovery of 1937, the fact that neither before 
nor since has the administration pursued a real positive expansionist program ... federal government 
engaged in salvaging program and not a program of positive expansion“. 
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 Table 8: Comparison of Two Crises: Budget Deficit/Surplus in Percent of GDP 
 
Source: WIFO-calculations using Mitchell (1993, 2003), Bordo (2008), IFS (1998), OECD, Eurostat, 
Bundesrechnungsabschluss: http://sourceoecd.org/, http://ec.europa.eu, 
http://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/berichte/bundesrechnungsabschluss.html.  
Figure 3: Budget Surplus/Deficit; Great Depression vs. Recent Crisis 
 
Source: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (1999; Central Government), OECD (General 
Government, net lending), IFS Yearbook. 
France. Country studies and qualitative historic evidence support this view (see 
Figure 3). 
The United States had small surpluses all over the twenties, with no cyclical 
pattern. This tendency continued 1929. Government expenditure increased in 1930 
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 and remained stable in 1931. Tax revenues first fell slightly then massively in 
1932. The decline was counteracted by massive tax increases across the board, but 
specifically in lower and medium income groups. An earned tax credit was 
slashed, corporate income tax was increased slightly, a gift tax was provided, and a 
new list of excise taxes was levied. On the local level general sale taxes and excise 
taxation were raised.26 Starting from 1932 the deficit jumped to 4.7% and then 
increased to 5.5% in 1934 and 7.0% in 1936. Some of the increases in expenditure 
had a semi intentional component, namely the introduction of large bonuses for 
veterans by congress in 1931 (and 1936). In the mid thirties the New Deal 
components were added.27
The United Kingdom continued to have budget surpluses over the whole 
period between 1929 and 1936 (with a tiny exception in 1932). Stabilizing 
budgets, not the economy seems to have been the priority. If the Great Depression 
was milder in the United Kingdom, this had definitely not been the consequence of 
an expansionary fiscal policy. The same is true for Japan. 
Austria and Germany had deficits already in 1930 and 1931, probably due to 
the stronger GDP drop, but tried to reduce them through discretionary policy 
measures. France had the most expansionary policy, at least from 1933 onwards. 
Sweden and Finland allowed their deficits to continue although these were not 
very considerable. 
_________________________ 
26 Full employment budgets were heavily contractionary—especially from 1933 to 1939 (Brown 
1956: 868). For a contrary view see Smithies (1946: 16): ”Fiscal policy did prove an effective and 
indeed the only effective means of recovery”. This remark refers however to the period from 1938 
onwards (and contrasts fiscal policy with government control on wages and prices). In April 1939 
President Roosevelt sent a document to Congress “Recommendations designed to stimulate further 
recovery”, ”that was the first outright recommendation, ... designed to achieve recovery through 
fiscal policy” (Smithies 1946: 16). “All the fiscal measures before had been trial and error, increasing 
some taxes, financing public work programs, then curbing expenditures to balance the budget, then 
enacting emergency budgets etc. ... The first phases of the New Deal continued Hoover’s policy of 
cheap money, home and farm relief programs, national industry recovery act, Labor Relations Act 
…”. For a recent evaluation of the potential of policy measures see Almunia (2009). 
27 The US budget was expansionary in 1936 due to a bill providing large veteran bonuses on the 
initiative of Congress. It was disliked but not vetoed by the President. The budget in 1937 was then 
specifically restrictive, due to the end of the bonuses and the start of social security contributions. 
This contractionary effect is described by Romer (2009) as the premature elimination of public 
support for the economy, which led to another recession (which ended as the budget became 
expansionary again). 
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 For the average of the ten countries, government debt rose slowly, from 57% 
of GDP 1929 to 59% in 1930 and 66% in 1931. Its level was extremely different. 
In France and the United Kingdom it was actually higher than GDP due to debt 
from World War I; in the United States, Germany and Austria it amounted only to 
20% (partly by renegotiating war debt). Debt ratios then increased at a somewhat 
faster rate in the thirties. 
5.2.2 Recent Crisis: Automatic Stabilizers plus Stimulus Packages 
Fiscal policy was intensively used in the recent crisis to mitigate the downturn (i) 
by allowing automatic stabilizers to work, (ii) recapitalizing banks and providing 
guarantees for banks and firms, and in addition (iii) by providing stimulus 
packages. The extent to which the downturn was curbed as a result of specific 
stimulus packages is not easy to assess.28 But the consensus is that they amounted 
to at least one percentage of GDP, both in 2009 and 2010, with higher stimulus 
levels in the United States and China, somewhat lower levels in the EU.29 The 
automatic stabilizers did the largest part of the job although it was very important 
that these were supported and not thwarted by discretionary restrictive measures.  
The overall budget deficit which had been 1.7%30 in 2008 jumped up to 6.4% 
in 2009 and is predicted to increase up to 7.8% in 2010. The weighted figures are 
even higher since the United States and the United Kingdom have double-digit 
deficits in 2010. The dramatic and decisive use of fiscal policy happened in the 
first and second year of the crisis. If we define the start of the recent crisis as 
_________________________ 
28 Different calculations do exist by OECD (2009a), EU Commission (2009a), and Saha and 
Weizsäcker (2009). The OECD estimates that the cumulative effect of the automatic stabilizers over 
2009 and 2010 made up for half of the “deterioration of fiscal balances” (OECD 2009a: 56). The 
remaining half is made up of “structural measures” which can be further subdivided into 
discretionary measures in response to the financial crisis (making up one fifth); and a larger part from 
the loss of exceptional revenues related to the asset price boom and the buoyant growth in 
construction and financial services. Total stimulus for OECD countries makes up 3.4% in the years 
2008 to 2010 together (2% is the unweighted average). For other calculations of the impact of fiscal 
stimulus see Breuss et al. (2009); for economic policy in general see Buiter (2008), Butschek (1978), 
Mooslechner (2008), Romer (1991), Schubert (2008), Schulmeister (2009) and Steindl (2007). 
29 Ireland, Hungary and Iceland could not afford an expansionary policy due to budget or currency 
problems. 
30 Unweighted average over the ten countries. 
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 September 2008 the packages were introduced within the first six months. The 
turnaround in the budgetary positions31 within one year was a striking difference 
to the late use of fiscal policy during the Great Depression. Even the New Deal or 
preparations for war after five or more years of depression in the thirties did not 
produce equivalent changes in the budgetary positions (see Table 8). 
The debt to GDP ratio jumped from 69% in 2008 to 79% in 2009 and is 
predicted to reach 86% in 2010. This level is higher than the maximum in the 
Great Depression and the increase in percentage points over two years is the same 
as that over six years during the Great Depression.32
5.2.3 Multipliers Are Different 
Indicators show that fiscal policy was very different in the Great Depression and 
today. During the Great Depression governments tried to mitigate or compensate 
the automatic stabilizers, this time they amplified them by stimulus packages. As 
to the impact of the fiscal stimuli in the first stage sound econometrics is needed, 
and the final evaluation must also include the effects of fiscal policy in the exit 
phase. 
Automatic stabilizers will be much higher today, due to higher share of tax 
rates (including social contributions) and higher transfers for unemployed. And 
they will be higher in Europe than in the United States, which is consistent with 
the policy response of higher stimulus packages in the United States. As far as 
multipliers over time are concerned there is some evidence that they decrease e.g. 
due to higher trade openness. There are also differences across econometric 
_________________________ 
31 In most countries it was a strong increase of the existing deficit. Very few countries had surpluses 
in their total fiscal balances at the start of the crisis. Japan and specifically the USA started with high 
deficits (2.5% and 2.9%, respectively). The euro area had a small deficit as compared to previous 
years (2007:  0.7%, but deficits were high in the United Kingdom and France). Even more 
stabilization would have been possible if all countries had entered this crisis with budget surpluses. 
31 For other countries see Eichengreen and Hatton (1988). 
32 Debt ratios are surprisingly less reliable than balances for this period. This is partly due to debts 
from the war period, which were defaulted or renegotiated, partly on an international scale, partly by 
bilateral agreements (for an overview see Eichengreen, 1992). 
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 models, e.g. traditional Keynesian models lead to a multiplier of 1.5, while New 
Keynesian DSGE models start with multipliers of 1, then decreasing to 0.4.33
Even if final policy conclusions are not the goal of this paper there are 
tentative implications relevant already for the near future (2011, 2012). We in 
general documented that economic policy was constituent for the relative mildness 
of the recent crisis. This must however lead to the symmetric conclusion, that it 
will be important for the exit phase to redraw stimulus not too hard and too quick. 
This is specifically the case if recovery is week, as it currently looks in Europe. 
Literature show that budget consolidations may not decrease economic growth 
automatically but it offers conditions under which this is more likely and these 
conditions should be considered earnestly (see Aiginger et al. 2010; Alesina 1988; 
Alesina and Ardagna 2009). 
6 Protectionism, Structural Differences and Caveats 
6.1 Protectionism and Coordination  
It is well known that the Great Depression was aggravated and became more 
severe because all countries tried to protect their own economy from the negative 
impacts of the world depression. The average tariff rate rose by 12.7% during the 
Great Depression.34 A specific form of protectionism, cited over and over in the 
literature, was the Smoot−Hawley Tariff Act, in which US-tariffs on imports were 
raised in 1930. In parallel, tariffs and duties were also increased in many other 
countries.  
It is difficult to find general indicators for protectionism. Our data set includes 
as only indicator available for both crises and each country the customs inflow as a 
_________________________ 
33 Cogan et al. (2009). For a recent attempt to analyze the impact of monetary and fiscal policy 
during the two crises see Almunia et al. (2009: 25). They conclude that “fiscal policy made little 
difference during the 1930s because it was not deployed on the requisite scale”. They suggest a 
positive impact of government expenditures on GDP during the interior period, with substantial fiscal 
multipliers. The study also provides some evidence that monetary policy was effective but with less 
robust results. Results are tentatively positive also for the recent crisis for both fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
34 Average over fourteen countries. 
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 percentage of GDP. It indicates that not only tariffs but also import duties were 
important at the time of the Great Depression; they constituted a major source of 
revenue for government. Increasing the duties had additionally the welcomed 
effect to protect domestic producers.  
Customs receipt in relation to GDP amounted to 0.6% for the United States 
between 1925 and 1928 and was flat. It changed little during the first years of the 
crisis, and if anything it decreased in the following years. Since trade dropped 
considerably this implies higher customs duties per unit of trade. There was no 
specific pattern in the following years, but then a steep increase in 1936.  
In European countries the level of custom inflows relative to GDP was three 
times as higher from the start.35 The receipts strongly increased already in the 
build-up period. 36 This was the case specifically in France, Germany and Austria. 
They were flat in the United Kingdom and decreased a little bit in Sweden. From 
1929 to 1935 customs inflow exploded in the United Kingdom (from 0.8% of GDP 
to 4.7%) and France (from 1.4% to 3.0%). The increase was not so pronounced in 
Germany and tariffs relative to GDP decreased in Austria starting in 1931.  
Thus protectionism, if measured correctly by customs receipts relative to GDP, did 
not start the Great Depression (at least in the United States), but played a role in 
prolonging and deepening it. It seems to have been applied more in Europe than in 
the United States, where the Smoot−Hawley Tariff Act is so prominently discussed.  
Another indicator which could contain indirect information on protectionism is 
the openness indicator (see Table 9). It combines information on export and import 
shares in GDP.37 It dropped from 34% to 20% between 1929 and 1932.38 Again 
the fall was less for the United States, namely “only” more than a third while it 
dropped by nearly one half for Germany, France and the United Kingdom39. The
_________________________ 
35 1.75% for 1925–1928 (unweighted average over European countries). 
36 The increasing importance of customs in the pre-crisis period of the Great Depression in Europe is 
a major difference to the recent crisis, which was preceded by a phase of trade liberalization. 
37 Nominal exports plus nominal imports divided by nominal GDP. 
38 Unweighted average for Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, the United States. 
39 Unweighted average. 
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 Table 9: Comparison of Two Crises: Openness and Change during the Crises 
 
Share of exports plus imports to GDP. – "World": Weighted by GDP. –1) 1Q2009/2Q2008. - 2) 
1Q2009/3Q2008. - 3) 2Q2009/1Q2008. - 4) 2Q2009/3q2007. – 5) - 1Q2009/1Q2008. - 6) 
2Q2009/4Q2006. - 7) 2Q2009/1Q2008 
Source: WIFO calculations using Mitchell (1993, 2003), IFS (1998), WTO. 
US “openness” decreased in the recent crisis less than in the Great Depression 
even in absolute changes and much less for relative changes.  
 
Neither receipts from import duties (relative to GDP) nor openness indicators 
are perfect indicators of protectionism in severe crises. Receipts may decrease if 
the duties successfully reduce imports; trade openness indicators may reflect 
export and import elasticity relative to GDP more than policy measures. However 
numerous analyses inter alia by international organizations stress that up to now 
protectionist measures had been limited in the recent crisis (OECD 2010; Francois 
and Stöllinger 2009). 
This time international coordination meetings (G20, EU Commission, IMF, 
and OECD) discussed and monitored the danger of protectionism (apart from the 
WTO). “Buy National Clauses” were clandestinely or openly put into many 
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 stimulus programs. However, this usually met with international protest. They 
were consequently softened, albeit not totally abandoned. New export duties came 
into existence even before the crisis (to limit the outflow of resources or food in 
the period of scarcity before the crisis started), but these have, up to now, been 
limited. Tensions could however rise if the crisis continues and large imbalances 
between countries begin to occur (see the conflict about tires between the United 
States and China in September 2009 and the Chinese threats of retaliation). 
6.2 Structural Differences  
Some changes in the structural characteristics of the world economy have helped 
to limit the recent crisis, some have increased the probability that a crisis would 
spread quickly, in a cumulative and accelerating spiral. 
One factor mitigating the impact of the crisis will have been the lower share of 
manufacturing in industrialized countries. It amounted to 25% or more in 1929, 
but now lies below 20% in most industrialized countries and at 12% in the United 
States.40 The service sector is less globalized and less cyclical (no inventories, no 
bulk investment as in manufacturing). The larger public sector also has a 
considerable stabilizing effect. It now amounts to more than 40% of GDP in most 
industrialized countries. Public goods are less exposed to economic cycles, and 
neither exported nor imported at a large scale. Furthermore, specific features of 
public revenue and expenditure contribute to the stabilization: higher marginal 
taxes and high replacement ratios for the unemployed increase the so called 
“automatic stabilization” effects of fiscal budget (for more factors defining the 
resilience of an economy see Aiginger (2009b)). 
On the other hand openness and globalization have increased. As already 
mentioned openness measured by the sum of the export and import ratio had been 
34% in 1929 and reached 56% in 2008.41. 
_________________________ 
40 It is however much higher if we include China and the share of manufacturing does not fall for 
real data to the same extent as for nominal data (Aiginger and Sieber 2006) and not for industrial 
latecomers (see Almunia et al. 2009). 
41 For the United States the figures are 9% versus 24%. For Germany and France the openness 
increased rather dramatically, namely from a little above 30% at the start of the Great Depression to 
73% and 46% in 2008. This reflects the impact of European Integration. The United Kingdom is the 
only exception insofar as openness has actually decreased according to this measure. Indicators on 
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 The size of financial sector is today much larger. Data available for 
industrialized countries show that it doubled in the United States between 1970 
and 2007 (from 4.1% to 7.9%), and increased its share in GDP by one quarter in 
the big EU countries (from 4.3% to 5.4%). 
6.3 Caveats 
We have to stress the limited scope of this paper and to add at least three caveats. 
We intentionally wanted primarily to present stylized facts. Since the facts we 
should chose to investigate, the period we analyzed and the policy indicators we 
reported all depended on the causes of the crisis, (and ideally also the long-run 
consequences), the paper is written with background knowledge (and sometimes 
personal interpretation) of the consensus of economists on the recent crisis. This 
background is partly reported in the paper and partly has to be evidenced by 
looking at the references.  
Caveat 1: The crisis is not over. The calculations depend on the assumption 
that there will be no general, large second dip in the activity indicators, after the 
indicators on trade, manufacturing output, GDP, stock market prices leveled off in 
2009 and then started to grow. The consensus among forecasting institutions is a 
growth in world GDP of about 3 % in 2010 and 2011. A small dip, lower growth 
rates in 2011 as compared to 2010 or even a growth recession would not change 
the results. The same holds true for country crises which can be ring fenced and do 
not spread into larger regional crises. The crisis is definitely not over insofar as 
unemployment remains high (or is even on the rise in 2010, this was incorporated 
in the calculations), since budget deficits are high, and since several causes of the 
crisis (disequilibria in the United States/China, regulatory problems in the 
financial sector, over liquidity concurring with a credit squeeze) are themselves 
not over. Sooner or later there could be echo effects or even a second crisis. 
However it will not be comparable to the second or third stage of the Great 
Depression. Then the crisis affected sector to sector with small interim periods of 
hope: first came the breakdown of the stock market, then that of trade and then 
banking failures. This time round all these three stages happened within the first 
_________________________ 
foreign direct investment and financial flows indicate increased globalization. Goods are traded today 
for longer distances and the horizon for direct investment has become worldwide 
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 three quarters of the first year of the crisis. Furthermore, GDP, industrial 
production and the stock market are increasing in 2010 on a scale they never did in 
the periods of interim optimism during the Great Depression. Therefore, it is a 
good time to make an assessment as to the depth of the crisis, even if the unsolved 
problems and the financial burdens taken on to combat the crisis may in 
themselves finally contribute to another crisis−and even if the recent crisis will 
lead to lower growth and higher unemployment levels for several years (and lost 
output may never be recovered) 
Caveat 2: The effects of policy interventions cannot be judged adequately today. 
Our indicators show that policy behaved different this time round and data 
suggests that this had a positive effect. Currently it looks like a striking success for 
Keynesian anti cyclical policy. We are however not even near to be able to make a 
final judgment. A full evaluation needs first of all sound econometrics; even this 
evidence will depend on models used. And it needs to know what echo shocks 
may arrive (e.g., debt crisis in Greece) and how they will handled. A final 
evaluation is possible only if we know how we will exit the crisis and how these 
exit strategies will influence economic activity. Many structural problems were not 
tackled in the build up phase, were then sidelined in the crisis, and will probably 
not been addressed in the exit phase due to a shortage of money or to economic 
policy paying little heed to these issues. 
Caveat 3: the analysis focuses on industrialized countries and is limited to 
indicators which are available for many countries. In fact the crisis as well as the 
policy reactions and problems in the aftermath of the crisis were very different 
between China, the United States and Europe. 
7 Summary 
The goal of this paper has been to provide stylized facts about the differences in 
the depth of the recent crisis and the Great Depression. This is important in view 
of the fact that some economists have claimed for several quarters after its start in 
mid 2008 that the recent crisis was as severe as the Great Depression (Eichengreen 
and O'Rourke 2009), while others have claimed that it “pales in comparison” with 
the Great Depression (Romer 2009). The facts are presented in view of the 
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 consensus that the recent crisis leveled off in mid-2009 for production but 
continues for unemployment in 2010. 
Stylized Fact 1: There is clear cut evidence that the recent crisis did not reach 
the dimensions of the Great Depression. This holds true for all seven activity 
indicators presented. There are especially large differences for real growth, 
employment and unemployment. Considerable differences for exports and prices 
can also be shown. The smallest difference was for manufacturing output in real 
terms. The difference as to stock market indices to some extent depends on the fact 
whether we use weighted or unweighted indices (since the decline of stock market 
prices was considerable less in the recent crisis for the United States but not for 
other countries). There had been severe deflation in the thirties, this time round 
there were a few but very short episodes where the overall price level declined. 
Taking GDP as overall measure for the depth of the recent crisis the drop in 
activity for industrialized countries was about half as strong as compared to the 
Great Depression vindicating Krugman's position of “half a Great Depression”. If 
we extend the analysis to all countries, world GDP declined by 1% only in 2009 
(using annual figures), in this perspective the recent crisis "pales in comparison" to 
the Great Depression supporting Romer's assessment. 
Stylized Fact 2: Economic activity has been more synchronized across 
countries in the build-up period to the recent crisis, and also for the first stage of 
the crisis itself. The Great Depression had two epicenters (Germany/Austria and 
the United States). This time round almost all industrialized countries had rather 
parallel declines in economic activity in the first three quarters of the crisis. The 
measures of dispersion across countries for all activity indicators are lower in this 
period. It is still an open question whether this will be the case for the exit phase 
too, since growth rates are very different across regions in 2010. 
Stylized Fact 3: The decline in the first nine months was stronger in the recent 
crisis for manufacturing and trade, supporting the view that this crisis had the 
potential to develop into a Great Depression. This was never the case for GDP, 
employment and unemployment. The share of the decline in the first year, relative 
to the overall decline for the prolonged crisis, was small in the Great Depression. 
By contrast this time, most, if not all, of the decline happened in the first nine 
months. The larger overall drop in activity in the Great Depression was the result 
of its length. The downturn of the stock market, of world trade, and finally the 
bank failures happened in different waves over years rather than simultaneously. 
www.economics-ejournal.org  32 
 Stylized Fact 4: Economic policy, specifically monetary policy and fiscal 
policy, re-acted quite differently in each crisis. This was partly due to lessons 
learned from the Great Depression itself. During the Great Depression fiscal policy 
was restrictive, at least during the first three years. It tried to keep budgets 
balanced and counteracted the automatic stabilizers by increasing tariffs and taxes 
and by reducing expenditure. In the recent crisis automatic stabilizers were a priori 
larger. Their effect was amplified by stimulus programs. Bank failures and the 
breakdown of the credit market were combated through the use of guarantees, 
recapitalization or nationalization. Furthermore, all these measures were 
implemented expeditiously and sometimes with coordination at an international 
level. The same difference in activity holds true for monetary policy. In 1929 
interest rates were first increased, and then cautiously reduced. High deflation 
turned the lower nominal rates into high real rates. Money supply declined over 
several years for many countries (at least in nominal terms). This time monetary 
policy slashed interest rates towards zero and engaged in traditional and innovative 
increases in money supply. Some institutional factors helped. There was no gold 
standard to limit money supply and fewer national currencies to defend due to 
European monetary integration. There was more consensus among economists and 
more international coordination due to the G7, G20, the IMF, and the World Bank. 
The stylized facts are compatible with the conclusions that (i) the recent crisis had 
the potential to develop into a much larger crisis and that (ii) fiscal and monetary 
policy prevented the recent crisis from developing into a crisis of the magnitude of 
that of the Great Depression. The final proof of the impact of economic policy 
needs empirical work with sophisticated models and methods and more knowledge 
about the further economic development. The stylized facts presented concentrate 
primarily on ten industrialized countries, even if, wherever possible, data on world 
output, trade, stock markets etc. are added. 
This time there were institutional factors which mitigated the danger of a 
larger crisis, such as the lower share of manufacturing and the higher share of 
services and the public sector (including transfers). However, there were also 
factors increasing the danger of cumulative downward spirals, namely the higher 
degree of openness, larger shares of international investment and finance and a 
larger financial sector in general. International cooperation hindered blunt forms of 
protectionism. Newly industrializing countries, specifically in Asia, used 
accumulated surpluses for stimulating their own economy and they had gained 
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 enough weight (due to recent growth) to contribute to the stabilization of the world 
economy.  
Our overall assessment is that the recent crisis (the Great Recession) and the 
Great Depression can be seen as siblings; those were born under different 
circumstances and were given different foster parents (insofar as economic policy 
reacted differently). Let’s watch how the luckier sibling (the younger one) 
matures. 
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Annex 
Employment policy 
International literature focuses on labor market policy in the Great Depression in 
the United States (For other countries see Eichengreen and Hatton (1988). The 
United States tried to mitigate unemployment early through intensive work relief 
programs (in which the government employed people at low wages). Starting in 
1930, 0.6% of unemployment and then in 1935 a maximum of 5.9% was “parked” 
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 in relief programs: the unemployment rate including relief program workers was 
20.1% in 1935, and 14.2% without them (Margo 1993: 42).  
A different important feature of labor market policy was that firms did not cut 
wages. Indeed real wages were increasing sharply during the recession e.g. by 20% 
between 1929 and 1931. This was followed by a phase where wages went up and 
down, but there was a general trend of 30% higher real wages in 1939 as compared 
to 1929 (Margo 1993; Bernanke 2004; etc). The macroeconomists of the time 
blamed the length of the recession for this trend of rising real wages. There had, 
however, also been a lot of variation in working times, which mitigated costs for 
firms and which may have encompassed an element of lowering wages not 
reflected in the statistics. There are several explanations as to why real wages 
increased despite the slump. The first one is the stickiness of nominal wages 
which, due to falling prices, increased in real terms. Other authors cite an echo 
effect from the recession in 1921, in which wages had been cut and the crisis 
worsened. Furthermore, reference is given to a social norm, that firms should not 
decrease wages in a recession. Finally, the concept of efficiency wages could be 
used. Firms did not like to cut wages since this lowers motivation and 
productivity. 
A macroeconomic policy, in the Keynesian form was not applied and there 
would not have been an appropriate channel at that time. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
Legislation, the National Industry Recovery Act of 1933, established guidelines 
that raised nominal wages and prices and encouraged higher levels of employment 
through reducing the working week. Part of the legislation was declared 
unconstitutional in May 1935. Weinstein (1980) investigated the effect of this 
legislation and it was criticized by Temin (1976) for making unemployment even 
more persistent. 
In the recent crisis, in many countries, labor market policies have been used to 
dampen the effects of declining economic activity on employment. Programs have 
been started to support shorter working times specifically in firms that have been 
hard-hit (“Kurzarbeitsprogramme”). This is likely to be the reason why e.g. in 
Germany and Austria the increase in unemployment and the decline in 
employment as compared with the decline in GDP is actually less than in the 
United States. A less pronounced decline in employment in turn stabilizes GDP 
via consumption. The impact of the crisis is also reduced if the mismatch between 
the supply and demand of qualifications is minimized and if regional and job 
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 mobility is increased. For the exit phase the dampening of the employment effect 
of the crisis could imply a slower response of the labor market specifically in 
Germany vs. the United States. 
A general shortening of work time has not been considered (the same holds for 
large early retirement programs), specifically since in most industrialized 
European countries the population of working age is predicted to shrink in the next 
years due to an ageing population.  
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